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Abstract
Our model studies couples time allocation and career choices, which are a¤ected by
a social norm on gender roles in the family. Parents can provide two types of informal
child care: basic care (feeding, changing children, baby-sitting) and quality care (activities
that stimulate childrens social and cognitive skills). We obtain the following main results.
Traditional mothers provide some informal basic care, whereas career mothers purchase full
time formal basic care in the market. Informal basic care is too large and the group of
career mothers is too small because of the social norm. Informal quality care is increasing
in the couples income and is provided in larger amount by mothers. We test the models
predictions for Italy using the most recent ISTAT Use of Time survey. In line with the
model, mothers devote more time than fathers to both basic and quality informal care; more
educated parents devote more time to quality informal care than less educated parents; more
educated mothers spend more time in the labor market than less educated mothers.
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1 Introduction
Womens labor force participation has been increasing steadily over the last decades in all de-
veloped countries; see Goldin (2006) and (2014), Kleven and Landais (2017). Nevertheless,
mothers continue to be the main providers of child care; see Paull (2008) or Ciccia and Verloo
(2012). Womens career choices contribute to this outcome. As a possible reason for the per-
sistence of child-care compatible (part-time) work many studies point to social norms shaping
womens preferences over family and career; see Fortin (2015), Farré and Vella (2013), Bertrand
et al. (2015), Bursztyn et al. (2017) and Kleven et al. (2018), among others. Social norms
contribute to the di¤erential sorting of men and women across occupations with women enter-
ing low pay occupations that allow for shorter working days or more exible working hours; see
Goldin (2014) and Card et al. (2016).
Two recent papers, Barigozzi et al. (2018 and 2019a) have examined the interplay between
social norms, career choices and child-care decisions. In their setting fathers always enter a high-
career path while mothers can enter a high-career path or a low-career one. In the latter case
mothers are traditionalbecause they are able to provide some informal child care. Career
mothers instead need to purchase full-time formal care in the market. The sorting of women
across career paths is endogenous and shaped by a social norm about gender roles in the family.
Via this social norm traditional mothersinformal care imposes an externality on career mothers,
who feel guilt if they provide less informal care than the amount provided by the median mother
in the previous generation (in Barigozzi et al. 2018); or than the average amount provided by
woman in the current generation (in Barigozzi et al. 2019a). Hence, in the laissez-faire, informal
care is too large and the share of career mothers is too small. This translates in ine¢ ciently
high child penalties so that ine¢ ciency and gender inequality go hand in hand.
In the theoretical part of this paper we generalize those models to distinguish between basic
child care and quality child care. Barigozzi et al. (2018 and 2019a) assume that total child care
must be equal to one. In other words, a young child needs full time care so that by denition
formal and informal care must add up to a constant normalized to one. We assume that this
constraint applies to basic child care but not to quality care; the total level of quality child
care is endogenous. To be more precise there is a trade o¤ between leisure and quality care.
We assume that the contribution of quality care to utility is larger for more productive couples.
This may be a matter of preferences and/or reect the fact that the childrens benet from
receiving quality informal care increases with their parents income or level of education; see,
among others, Chiappori et al. (2017) and Doepke et al. (2019) and references within.
While we do present the optimal allocation in our economy, we otherwise focus on positive
aspects. Specically, we characterize the equilibrium (laissez faire) solution and examine its
properties focusing on the coupleskey choice variables. We show that mothers devote more
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time than fathers to both basic and quality informal care and that time devoted to quality child
care by both mothers and fathers is increasing in the family income. In addition, career mothers
spend more time in the labor market than traditional mothers and time devoted to basic child
care by mothers is decreasing in the family income.
These results directly translate into testable implications, which we confront with the data
in the second part of the paper. We use the most recent available Italian ISTAT Use of Time
survey, carried out in 2013, and consider the following time categories: informal child care, split
up into basic and quality child care, household work and market work. This categorization
follows Barigozzi et al. (2019b) who study how individuals of di¤erent gender, age, education
and background allocate their time among several activities across a time span of more than 10
years (20022013).
The descriptive statistics reported in the tables along with some tests and a simple regression
analysis suggest that our rst three predictions are consistent with the data. The fourth predic-
tion, on the other hand, namely that time devoted to basic child care by mothers is decreasing
in the family income is not conrmed. However, we argue that this is likely to be an artifact of
the classications adopted in the data. Specically, we consider only the primary activity that
is reported and some basic child care is likely to be lumped together with household work. This
conjecture is vindicated by the fact that a revisited version of Prediction 4, namely that total
time devoted to basic child care and household work by mothers is decreasing in the family
income is consistent with the data.1
Overall the empirical results show that Italian mothers provide more informal care and much
more household work than their partners; for a more detailed analysis of those and other gender
gaps characterizing Italian families see Barigozzi et al. (2019b). Our theoretical model provides
a possible explanation of the observed gender gaps in informal care provision shaped by a social
norm on gender roles in the family.
2 The model
The model builds on Barigozzi et al. (2018, 2019a). Consider a population of couples with
children, the size of which is normalized to one. Each couple consists of a mother m, a father
1A second reason why, in the sample, time devoted to basic child care by mothers is not decreasing in the
family income is related to the fact that we use education as a proxy for womens career prospects. The 20%
of working mothers are school teachers in Italy. School teachers are highly educated and thus are considered
career mothersin the sample. However school teachers represent traditional mothersin our theoretical model
because they typically have no career prospects but enjoy the exibility to provide more informal basic care than
mothers in other full-time jobs. This implies that the average time devoted to basic informal child care by career
mothers in the sample is overestimated.
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f, and a given number of children. Couples choose their career path, their consumption, and
the amount of basic informal child care and quality informal child care provided to their children.
There exist two types of career paths (indexed by j). In the less demanding, low-career
path, j = `, working hours are exible and individuals can freely choose how much time to
spend in the labor market. The time not spent at work can be used for basic child care ci, where
i = f;m. Hence, the low-career path can be seen as a part-time work where the number of
working hours are chosen by the parent. Basic child care corresponds to the time devoted to the
basic needs of children: feeding, food preparation, washing, changing children and baby-sitting.
In the full engaging high-career path, j = h, individuals have to work the entire working part
of the day so that there is no time for basic child care. We also assume that, both in the high-
and in the low-career path, parents are free to allocate part of their leisure time to quality care:
helping children with homework, reading books, playing games with them and so on. To sum
up, couples face two time constraints: basic child care a¤ects the allocation of parents time
during the working-day. Given that children must be taken care of the whole working day that
we normalize to one, we have that, for each couple, 1 = cf + cm + cp; where cp is formal basic
child care purchased by parents in the market. In addition, a part of the available per-day
leisure time, L; can be devoted by each parent to quality child care so that we have: L = Li+di;
i = f;m; where Li is parents i leisure time and di is quality child care.
Both jobs pay the wage rate y, but the high-career path comes with additional future earning
possibilities qi. We let qf 2 [0; Q] and qm = qf 2 [0; Q]; with  2 (0; 1]. An  < 1 captures
pure discrimination: unequal pay for equally qualied workers, as it continues to be documented
in nearly all developed countries.2 Observe that while  < 1 adds a measure of realism, it will
not be essential for our results that all continue to hold when  = 1. Future revenue qf is
distributed according to F with density f . Future earning opportunities are perfectly correlated
in a couple. Consequently, there is a single level of qm associated with each level of qf .3
Child care bought in the private market is denoted by cp. The latter costs p per unit of
time. We let p = y, meaning that the current salary of one member in the couple exactly covers
the costs of buying full-time child care on the private market.4 When parents enter a exible
job their salary decreases proportionally to the time devoted to basic care. Informal and private
2The parameter  generates the unexplained component in the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the GWG;
see Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973). Equation (5) below presents the decomposition of the GWG obtained in
our model.
3Assortative mating is commonly observed and has been increasing over the last decades; see Chiappori et al.
(2017) and references within.
4This assumption is simply a normalization that has no relevance for our results. Without it we would obtain
a term proportional to (p   y) in the rst-order conditions with respect to child care. This would a¤ect the
equilibrium levels of child care but otherwise all other results are not a¤ected.
4
basic care constitute a family public good and its value to the parents is given by:
G (cf ; cm; cp) = v(cf + cm) + v(cp);
where v0 > 0; v00 < 0 and v(0) = 0. Care provided by the father and mother are thus perfect
substitutes while informal and private care are imperfect substitutes, with private care being
(weakly) less welfare-enhancing than informal care,  2 (0; 1].5
Quality child care cannot be purchased in the market and is only provided by the parents.
It represents another family public good whose value to the parents is given by:
i (q) vd (di) ; i = f;m:
As before v0d > 0; v
00
d < 0 and vd(0) = 0. In addition i (q) denotes how important are the
childrens cognitive achievements and progress for parent-i; with 0i (q) > 0: the relevance of this
public good is increasing in the couples future career prospects and is gender-specic.6 Mothers
attribute more importance to childrens socialization than fathers and report larger parental role
responsibilities towards cognitive progress and childrens achievements (Yeung et al. 2001, and
Craig 2006 among others); hence we assume f (q)  m (q) 8q.
Following Akerlof and Kranton (2000; 2010), individuals may su¤er a disutility by deviating
from the social categories that are associated with their identity (that is, an individuals sense
of self), which causes behavior to conform to these norms. We assume that individuals desire to
conform to the behavior of the group they belong to, namely the behavior of women for mothers
and the behavior of men for fathers. Mothers feel guilt if they provide less informal basic care
than the average amount of care provided by woman in the society.7 Fathers, by contrast, su¤er
from social stigma when they devote more time to informal basic care than the average amount
of time devoted to care by man in the society.8
The social norm cost for mothers is given by m(maxf0; cm   cmg), where cm is the average
time spent in basic child care by mothers in the society. For fathers, it is given by f (maxf0; cf 
cfg), where cf is the average basic time spent with children by fathers. The parameter i 2 [0; 1];
i = f;m; reects the costs of norm deviations.
5See, for instance, Gregg et al. (2005), Bernal (2008), and Huerta et al. (2011).
6Given that career prospects are perfectly correlated in the couple, without generality loss, we consider the
following transformation ~f (q) = f (q).
7The psychology literature points out that social norms on gender roles may cause mothers who work full-time
to feel guilt when delegating the care of their children to others; see, Guendouzi (2006), Rotkirch and Janhunen
(2010) and Rose (2017), among others.
8See, as an example, Haas and Hwang (2019) and references within. For a general overview see
Paternity Leave: The Rewards and the Remaining Stigma The NYT, Nov. 7, 2014; available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/09/upshot/paternity-leave-the-rewards-and-the-remaining-stigma.html.
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Apart from basic and quality informal care, each parent derives utility from consumption of a
numeraire commodity xi and from leisure time Li = L di according to the function vL
 
L  di

,
with v0L > 0; v
00
L < 0 and v
0
L (0) = 0.
The timing of couplesdecisions is as follows: rst, parents choose their career path and
then, in the second stage, they choose consumption and the amount of child care (be it formal
or informal). Parents act cooperatively and maximize the sum of their utilities:
W = xm + xf +G(cf ; cm; cp) + m (q) vd (dm) + f (q) vd (df ) (1)
+ vL
 
L  dm

+ vL
 
L  df
  m(maxf0; cm   cmg)  f (maxf0; cf   cfg):
2.1 Couples optimization
We rst analyze the choice of child care activities for a given career path. Then, by proceeding
backward, we consider the choice of career path made by the couple. This allows us to determine
the average basic child care provided in the society and thus to dene the cost of the social norm
both for fathers and for mothers. We consider only decisions made at the second stage by the
couples that turn out to be relevant for our analysis, namely the couples where (i) only the
father enters the high-career path while the mother enters the exible job market (traditional
couples), and those where (ii) both parents take up the high-career path; see Appendix A.1 for
the dominated couplesdecisions.9
Traditional couple. We denote welfare of this couple by Wh`, where the rst subscript
refers to the fathers career choice and the second subscript refers to the mothers career choice.
Since the father took up the high-career path he is not able to provide basic care and cf = 0.
Hence, cf   cf  0 and the father does not su¤er any cost associated with the social norm.
Noting that cm + cp = 1; the couple chooses child care private provision to maximize (1) where
xh` = xm + xf = y + q because p = y. The optimal level of informal low-quality child care is
thus implicitly determined by
v0(ch`) = v
0(1  ch`): (2)
First-order condition (2) indicates that traditional mothers provide informal basic care, ch`, up
to the point where marginal utility from informal care equals the marginal benet from formal
care, 1  ch`.
The marginal norm cost for traditional mothers, m; does not enter the FOC (2); they do
not su¤er any norm cost because by denition we have chh = 0 so that c

h` > c > c

hh = 0.
9Having only the mother in the high-career path is dominated by having both parents in the high-career path
because the latter involves no norm costs for the father and higher future benets. Similarly, having both parents
entering the low-career path can never be optimal since then the couple forgoes future benets qf . As a result,
the social norm for fathers is never binding in equilibrium.
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The optimal level of quality care, di ; provided by the two parents is implicitly dened by:
i (q) v
0
d (di) = v
0
L
 
L  di

; i = f;m: (3)
First-order condition (3) indicates that each parent provides quality care, di; up to the point
where marginal utility from quality care equals its marginal cost in terms of leisure.
The indirect utility of this h` couple as a function of informal basic and quality child care
writes:
W h` = y + q + v(c

h`) + v(1  ch`) + m (q) vd (dm)
+ f (q) vd
 
df

+ vL
 
L  dm

+ vL
 
L  df

High-career couple. High-career couples have to buy the full amount of basic care in the
market. Quality care is instead chosen again according to (3). Since cf = 0; the father does
not su¤er any cost associated with the social norm. As a result, the social norm for fathers is
binding neither in traditional nor in career-couples. Thus, we can simplify the notation writing
cm = c and m = : High-career mothers su¤er the cost from deviating from the norm and the
couples welfare amounts to:
W hh = y + q(1 + ) + v(1) + m (q) vd (d

m) + f (q) vd
 
df

+ vL
 
L  dm

+ vL
 
L  df
  c;
where dm and df are the same as in W

h`: Also note that high-career couples who exclusively
have to rely on private basic child care are those with higher consumption levels, that is xh` =
y + q < xhh = y + q(1 + ).
We are now in the position to analyze the couples decision about the two partnerscareer
paths. Families have to choose whether to be a high-career hh couple fully relying of formal
child care, or to be a traditional h` couple where the mother provides some informal care. A
couple will become a high-career couple if it is beneciary to do so, that is if W hh W h`, or if
q  q^  1

[v(ch`) + v(1  ch`)  v(1) + c] :
The marginal couple q^ is the couple where parents are indi¤erent between belonging to a
traditional and to a career couple. Given q^ we can now dene average informal basic child care
in society:
c =
Z q^
0
ch`f(q)dq = F (q^
)ch`:
2.2 Market outcome
An allocation is fully described by the identity of the marginal couple, by the amount of informal
basic care provided by traditional couples and by the amount of informal quality care provided
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by traditional and career couples. The following proposition characterizes the laissez-faire al-
location.
Proposition 1 (Characterization of the market outcome) When mothers who do not pro-
vide basic child care su¤er from deviating from the social norm, i.e.  > 0, and/or the job market
su¤ers from gender discrimination,  < 1, then:
(i) it is never optimal for fathers to take up the low-career path;
(ii) the marginal couple is given by
q^ =
1

[v(ch`) +  [v(1  ch`)  v(1)] + F (q^)ch`)] ; (4)
couples with future job opportunities higher or equal to the threshold q^ choose the high-
career path for both parents;
(iii) informal basic care provided by traditional mothers, ch`, satises equation (2);
(iv) informal quality care provided by mothers and fathers, di , i = f;m; satises equation (3).
It is relatively larger for mothers within couples and is increasing in q across couples.
There are both traditional and career couples in the economy if q^ 2 (0; Q). From (4), an
interior solution requires that q^ exists such that q^ = (1=)[v(ch`) +  [v(1  ch`)  v(1)] +
F (q^)ch`] < Q: Due to the concavity of v; v(ch`) +  [v(1  ch`)  v(1)] > 0 holds so that the
previous inequality is always met provided that Q is su¢ ciently large and F (q^) is concave, which
we assume in the remainder of the paper.
Point (iv) of Proposition 1 indicates that mothers provide more informal quality care than
fathers and the higher the career prospects the larger the level of informal quality care. As a
result, career couples provide more informal quality care than traditional couples and, within
both traditional and career couples, informal quality care increases with q:
The gender wage gap (GWG) is dened as the di¤erence in total income earned by mothers
and fathers in equilibrium and is given by:
GWG =
Z Q
0
[y + q]f(q)dq  

F (q^)y (1  ch`) +
Z Q
q^
[y + q]f(q)dq

= F (q^)ch`y| {z }
child penalty
+
Z q^
0
qf(q)dq| {z }
adverse sorting
+
Z Q
q^
(1  )qf(q)dq| {z }
plain discrimination
(5)
The GWG decomposes in the gap between the hours worked because of family duties, and in
the di¤erent return to labor supplied in sectors where man and women are employed. The rst
term in (5) thus represents child penalty (see Blau and Kahn 2017; Kleven et al. 2018):
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mothers in traditional couples do not work full time, but spend part of their time to provide
informal basic care. Child penalty thus depends on average informal basic care, c = F (q^)ch`;
provided by traditional mothers. The second term accounts for the fact that women forego
the extra earning opportunities associated with the high-career path. Interestingly, both child
penalty and adverse sorting are a¤ected by social norms and child care decision through
q^. They decrease when the share of career mothers in the society increases. The model thus
o¤ers a clean explanation of how social pressure determines women sorting and thus their low
participation in leading positions together with lower wages. Finally, the last term in (5) captures
the unexplained component of the GWG of the OaxacaBlinder decomposition, or the plain
discrimination part; it vanishes when  = 1.
2.2.1 Welfare analysis of the market outcome
To characterize the ine¢ ciency created by the social norm we consider now the (unweighted)
sum of utilities of all households. An e¢ cient or rst-best (fb) allocation is dened by the
indi¤erent couple, q^fb (which determines the share of female participation in the high-career
path), by the level of informal basic care chosen by traditional couples, ch` for q < q^fb (recall
that, by denition, cfbhh = 0) and by the level of quality care di, i = f;m.
Specically, the e¢ cient allocation fch`; df ; dm; q^g maximizes the following welfare function:
SW =
Z q^
0
 
y + q + m (q) vd (dm) + f (q) vd (df )

f(q)dq
+
Z Q
q^
 
y + q(1 + ) + m (q) vd (dm) + f (q) vd (df )

f(q)dq (6)
+ F (q^) (v(ch`) + v(1  ch`)) + (1  F (q^)) (v(1)  c) + vL
 
L  dm

+ vL
 
L  df

where c = F (q^)ch`.
The e¢ cient level of informal basic care, cfbh`; is implicitly given by:
v0(ch`) = v0(1  ch`) + [1  F (q^fb)]: (7)
The left-hand side denotes the social marginal benet of informal basic care while the right-
hand side denotes the social marginal cost of formal care. Compared to the market outcome
described in (2), the marginal benet contains an additional term [1 F (q^fb)] which reects the
negative externality of informal basic care provision on type-hh couples whose share is 1 F (q^fb).
Informal basic care is thus ine¢ ciently high in the market outcome: ch` > c
fb
h`.
Informal quality care is implicitly dened by the same FOC (3) and its level is thus e¢ cient
in the market outcome.
The FOC wrt q^ can be rewritten as:
q^fb  1

f[v(cfbh`) + (v(1  cfbh`)  v(1))] + F (q^fb)cfbh`   [1  F (q^fb)]cfbh`g (8)
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Comparing (4) and (8) and recalling that ch` > c
fb
h`, we observe that q^
 > q^fb, that is the share
of high-career couples is ine¢ ciently low in the market outcome.
To sum up, the negative externality generated by the social norm translates into overcon-
sumption of informal basic care by traditional couples in the market outcome. This implies that
the share of women entering the high-career path is ine¢ ciently low. Concerning the GWG, in
the market outcome both the child penalty and adverse sorting are ine¢ ciently high. To see
why consider that, for any given q; in the market outcome the female spouses earnings are less
than or equal to her rst-best earnings. Indeed, child penalty is too high because womens labor
income is too low due to the ine¢ ciently high informal basic care (ch` > c
fb
h`). The optimal level
of child penalty would thus be obtained when the negative externality exerted by traditional
mothers on career mothers is properly taken into account. Finally, adverse sorting is ine¢ ciently
high because in families where q 2 [q^fb; q^] women take the wrong decision of staying out of the
high-career path and thus forgo the benet from future prospects.
3 Testing the models implications
The model yields the following testable predictions.
1 Mothers devote more time than fathers to both basic and quality informal care.
2 Time devoted to quality child care by both mothers and fathers is increasing in the family
income.
3 Career mothers spend more time in the labor market than traditional mothers.
4 Time devoted to basic child care by mothers is decreasing in the family income.
About point 1, in the model the time devoted to basic care by career fathers and career
mothers is zero by assumption because of the full-time working constraint. As a result only
traditional mothers allocate time to basic informal child care. While both fathers and mothers
devote time to quality informal care. As to Prediction 2 recall that, in the model, the higher the
career prospects q and the higher the utility parents receive from providing quality child care.
This implies that informal quality care increases with the familys labor income. In addition,
for any given level of q, mothers devote more time to informal quality care than their partners.
Moving to Prediction 3, it translates into: high-income mothers spend more time in market
workthan low-income mothers. Finally, to be more specic about Prediction 4, in the model
career mothers do not have time for basic informal care because they work full-time. Traditional
mothers instead are exible and are able to supplement formal care with some informal basic
care.
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Before moving to time use data, observe that the most obvious proxy for career prospects,
q, is the socio-economic status of the family. In what follows we will refer to q as the parents
level of education.
3.1 Data on time devoted to informal child care in Italy
In a recent working paper, Barigozzi et al. (2019b) study how individuals of di¤erent gender,
age, education and background allocate their time among several activities across a time span of
more than 10 years (20022013) in Italy, analyzing data from the ISTAT Use of Timesurveys.
Pooling together three di¤erent cross-sections, they compare time use allocation in di¤erent time
categories across specic socio-demographic groups, with a special focus on gender di¤erences
and their trends. To test the implications of the theoretical model presented in Section 2, in the
current paper we resort to the most recent available Italian Use of Timesurvey, carried out
in 2013, and consider the following time categories: informal child care, split up into basic and
quality child care, household work and market work. For the description of the specic activities
included in each time category and more information on the features of ISTAT time use data
see Barigozzi et al. (2019b).
Sample selection The Italian Use of Timeis a multi-member household survey collecting
information on each member of the interviewed households. For consistency with our theoretical
model, we restrict our sample to couples with at least one child under the age of 14. This results
in 4,622 observations, equally split between mothers and fathers. In our theoretical model,
for the sake of simplicity, all mothers participate in the labor market. However, the share of
nonemployed mothers is very high in Italy and corresponds to almost 42% of mothers in our
sample (see Table 1). To obtain representative results, we decided to include both employed and
nonemployed women in the sample. In terms of the theoretical model, nonemployed mothers
can be interpreted as those mothers with the highest exibility in providing child care.
Table 2 reports some descriptive statistics of our sample and the average values of weekly time
spent by parents in informal child care (Basic_child, Quality_child, Child_care = Basic_child
+ Quality_child ), household work, total household work (TOThousehold_work = basic_child
+ household_work) and market work. We created the category TOThousehold_work to account
for the whole low-quality time devoted by parents to the family. For the sake of simplicity,
household work is not considered in the theoretical model, but it represents a relevant component
of the family burden (see below). Consequently, it is reasonable to associate household work
and basic child care. Indeed household work can be done simultaneously with some basic child
care (doing the cooking, cleaning and laundry and purchasing food while baby-sitting), whereas
quality child care is not compatible with household work, and the two activities are mutually
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exclusive. Table 2 shows that the average time devoted to household work and market work by
parents is basically the same: 18.91 and 18.83 hours per week, respectively.10 The average time
devoted by parents to total child care is much lower, 7.49 hours per week, and is almost equally
distributed between basic and quality child care: 3.96 and 3.53 hours per week, respectively.
In Table 3 and 4, we perform tests for the di¤erence in group means for each time category.
In Table 3, parents are grouped only by gender, without accounting for their educational level.
On the contrary, in Table 4, parents are grouped by level of education, without taking into
account their gender.
Table 3 conrms Prediction 1. Mothers devote slightly more time to quality care than fathers
do (3.83 against 3.24 hours per week) and devote more than twice as much time to basic child
care as fathers (5.68 a opposed to 2.25 hours per week). Overall, mothers devote roughly twice
as much time to total informal care as fathers and this pattern is mainly driven by basic child
care. Gender tests are highly signicant for all the three categories of informal care: basic child
care, quality child care, and for their sum.
The data presented in Table 4 show that Prediction 2 is also conrmed: time devoted to
quality child care by parents is increasing in their education. More specically, parents with a
university degree devote almost one more hour per week to quality child care than less educated
parents, and the di¤erence is highly signicant.
In Table 5 we group parents by both gender and education and thus consider four types of
parents: fathers with high school or inferior degree; fathers with University degree; mothers with
high school or inferior degree and mothers with University degree. This allows the gender gap
to depend on education and vice versa. Let k denote the time category, with k belonging to the
set fquality child care, basic child care, total child care, household work, total household work,
market work}. We test for the gender and education gaps by means of a descriptive regression
model, where time devoted to category k is expressed as follows:
Time_spent_in_activity_k = 0k + 1kmother+ 2kUniversity+ 3kInteraction+ :
For all observations i = 1; ::::4622 in our sample, mother is a dummy taking value 1 if i is a
woman and 0 otherwise, University is a dummy taking value 1 if i has a University degree and
0 otherwise, while Interaction represents the interaction of the two dummies, thus taking value
1 if i is a woman and has a University degree.
Therefore, the values reported in Tables 5 corresponds to estimates of the following popula-
tion parameters:
10The decimals refer to one additional weekly hour. For example, 7.55 hours per week amount to 7 hours and
33 minutes.
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 
0k
: average time dedicated to category k by a father with High School or inferior degree;
 
0k
+ 1k : average time dedicated to category k by a mother with High School or inferior
degree ;
 
0k
+ 2k : average time dedicated to category k by a father with University degree;
 
0k
+ 1k + 2k + 3k: average time dedicated to category k by a mother with University
degree.
And the estimated gaps correspond to:
 1k : gender gap for parents with at most High School degree;
 1k + 3k : gender gap for parents with University degree;
 2k : education gap for fathers;
 2k + 3k : education gap for mothers.
The tests for the existence of these gaps (which amount to the tests for the di¤erence in the
group means) are reported in Table 5, which allows us to analyze Prediction 2 in more detail.
From Table 5 we observe that the di¤erence in hours devoted to quality care by fathers does
not change much with education. Specically, less educated fathers spend 3.17 hours per week
in quality care versus 3.62 hours per week for more educated fathers, but the di¤erence is not
signicant. Instead less educated mothers devote 3.66 hours per week to quality care versus
4.49 hours per week for more educated mothers, and this di¤erence is highly signicant. Hence
we can conclude that the di¤erence in time devoted to quality care by less and more educated
parents displayed in Table 3 is totally driven by mothersbehaviors.
Moreover, Table 5 provides empirical evidence supporting Prediction 3: mothers with a
university degree spend more time in market workthan mothers without a university degree.
Specically, less educated mothers devote 10.65 hours per week to market work versus 13.52
hours per week for mothers with a University degree. The di¤erence is only signicant at a 5%
level. Interestingly the opposite pattern seems true for fathers, since more educated fathers work
less than their less educated counterpart, however the di¤erence is not statistically signicant.
Table 5 suggests that Prediction 4 is at odds with the data because more educated mothers
spend more time in basic care than less educated mothers. The di¤erence amounts to more than
two hours per week and is highly signicant. Note, however, that Prediction 4 becomes more
consistent with the data if we account for the total amount of time that mothers devote to the
household. Recall that TOThousehold workis the sum of time devoted to basic_childand
household_work. More educated women spend less time in household_workbecause they
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are more likely to purchase these services in the market (by employing a cleaning person, for
example). The di¤erence in household work by education amounts to almost 7 hours per week
and is highly signicant. By delegating to other people at least part of the household work,
more educated mothers turn out to devote less time to the house and to the basic needs of their
kids than less educated mothers. Indeed, less educated women devote 36.33 hours per week
to TOThousehold workagainst 31.45 hours per week for more educated women. Thus, it is
reasonable to rephrase Prediction 4 as follows:
4 (revisited) Total time devoted to basic child care and household work by mothers is decreasing in the
family income.
As mentioned before, this pattern is totally driven by household work. However, basic child
care provided by less educated mothers is likely to be understated because, when devoting time
to household work, mothers can simultaneously take care of a child while reporting household
work as their primary activity. From that perspective, we observe that the hours per week
devoted by less educated mothers to household work (31.05) are more than 6 times the hours
devoted to basic child care (5.27), conrming that baby-sitting at home is likely to overlap, at
least in part, with mothershousehold works. In addition, the gender gap in household work
is very high and persists across di¤erent educational levels, a property which is consistent with
Barigozzi et al. (2019b). Irrespective of the level of education, fathers devote about 8 hours per
week to household work and, on average, the gender gap amounts to 21 hours per week (see
Table 3).
Finally we provide some additional information on the sample of mothers that we consider.
From Table 1 we observe that non-employed mothers belong to one of the following ve cat-
egories: unemployed, housewives, students, retired and other. Housewives represent the largest
category among the non-employed mothers and make up about 30% of the mothers subsample.
The last row of Table 6 shows that about 25% of mothers in the whole sample have a university
degree. Among these more educated mothers, about 81% are employed while among less edu-
cated mothers the percentage of employed drops to about 52%, suggesting a strong association
between having a university and employment. The non negligible share of less educated mothers
who are not employed (and devote no time to market work) a¤ects the average time mothers
devote to work which is reported in Table 5. This indeed corresponds to an unconditional mean
calculated for both employed and non-employed mothers. Our result on the education gap in
mothersmarket work is thus likely to be overestimated.
As a latest remark about Prediction 4 on time devoted to basic child care by mothers,
note that school teachers enter as educated women in the Time Use survey, but they represent
traditional mothersin our theoretical model because they have little or no career prospects, but
benet from large exibility. In particular, Italian school teachers are able to provide informal
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basic care in the afternoon, after their classes.11 This is another reason why Prediction 4, in its
original formulation, does not appear to be consistent with the data.
4 Conclusion
We study coupleschild care and career decisions. Basic child care can be provided informally or
bought in the market. The total amount is given and imposed by the requirement that a small
child needs constant care. For quality child care, on the other hand, spousescontributions and
the total level are endogenous. Parents trade o¤ leisure against quality care, the benets of which
depend on their own career prospects/productivity. High career mothers su¤er from a norm cost
caused by mothersguilt. Through their basic child care choices low career mothers create a
negative externality via the norm cost. Consequently, the laissez faire solution is ine¢ cient; it
implies too much informal child care and a share of high-career mothers which is too low.
Our theoretical model yields four main stylized facts which we confront with data from
the ISTAT Use of Timemost recent survey carried out in 2013. By using education as a
proxy for the career prospects of couples, we nd that three predictions from the model are
conrmed by the data. In Italian families, (i) mothers devote more time than fathers to both
basic and quality informal care; (ii) time devoted to quality informal care by both mothers and
fathers is increasing in education; (iii) time spent in the labor market by mothers increases
with education. A forth prediction from the model, namely that basic informal care provided by
mothers decreases in education, is not consistent with the data. We explain this incongruity by
the fact that our theoretical model disregards time devoted by parents to household work which
represents a relevant burden for mothers in Italy (an average of 29.68 hours per week against
8.13 hours per week for fathers) and mothers may provide household work when baby-sitting.
Specically, mothers can indicate household work as their rst activity and baby-sitting as their
secondary activity (but we only account for primary activity in this study). In addition, in Italy,
about the 20% of employed and married women works as teachers in the Public Sector where
workers are relatively exible and have time to perform more basic informal care than other
full-time workers. This has lead us to consider a revisited forth prediction of the model, namely
that (iv) time devoted to basic informal care and household work by mothers is decreasing in
the family income. We have show that this prediction is consistent with the data. This, in turn,
is due to the fact that more educated mothers purchase some household work in the market.
11Unfortunately the survey does not allow us to know the percentage of school teachers among employed mothers
in the sample. However, this percentage is likely to be important. Indeed, the 83% of Italian school teachers
are women, the average in the OECD Countries being 68%; see Gender imbalances in the teaching profession,
OECD (2017). And we know from Del Boca et al. (2000) that the 19% of Italian married and employed women
was working as teacher in 1995.
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To conclude, a gender gap in informal child care provision persists in Italian families (an
average gap of 4 hours per week that increases with education) and a much stronger gender
gap in household work still exists (with an average gap of 21.55 hours per week that decreases
with education). Our theoretical model provides a possible explanation for such gaps based on a
social norm on gender roles in the family and on a persisting gender inequality of opportunities
in the labor market.
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Appendix
A.1 Couplesoptimization
A.1.1 Only the mother enters the high-career path
Since the mother is in the high-career path, she is not able to take care of the children, and
cm = 0. Hence, cm   ch` > 0 and the mother su¤ers the cost of not conforming to the norm. If
the father provides some child care he su¤ers because of the norm too, so that here both social
norms are potentially binding.
Welfare of this couple is denoted by W`h. Noting that c`h + cp = 1 and p = y; the couple
chooses cf = c`h; dm and df to maximize:
max
c`h;dm;df
W`h = y + q + v(c`h) + v(1  c`h)  f (maxf0; c`h   cfg)  mcm
+ m (q) vd (dm) + f (q) vd (df ) + vL
 
L  dm

+ vL
 
L  df

:
While the choice of dm and df is as in the main text, optimal child care provision, c`h; is implicitly
determined by:
v0(c`h) = v
0(1  ch`) + If
where I is an indicator function which takes value 1 when the social norm for fathers is binding,
namely when c`h > cf , and 0 otherwise.
Indirect welfare W `h writes:
W `h = y + q + v(c

`h) + v(1  c`h)  f (maxf0; c`h   cfg)  mcm
+ m (q) vd (d

m) + f (q) vd
 
df

+ vL
 
L  dm

+ vL
 
L  df

:
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A.1.2 Both couples enter the low-career path
Here again, if the father provides some child care, he su¤ers because he deviates from the norm.
Both social norms are potentially binding. Welfare of this couple is denoted by W``. Noting
that cm + cf + cp = 1 and p = y; the couple chooses c`` = cm + cf to maximize:
max
cm;cf ;dm;df
W`` =(1  cf ) y + (1  cm) y   p(1  c``)
+ v(c``) + v(1  c``)  f (maxf0; c`h   cfg)  m(maxf0; cm   cmg)
+ m (q) vd (dm) + f (q) vd (df ) + vL
 
L  dm

+ vL
 
L  df

=y + v(c``) + v(1  c``)  f (maxf0; c`h   cfg)  m(maxf0; cm   cmg)
+ m (q) vd (dm) + f (q) vd (df ) + vL
 
L  dm

+ vL
 
L  df

The choice of dm and df is again as in the main text, whereas optimal child care provision,
c`` = c

m + c

f ; is implicitly determined by the two conditions:
v0(cf )  v0(1  c``) + If
v0(cm)  v0(1  c``) + Im
Welfare W `` now is:
W `` = y + v(c

``) + v(1  c``)  f (maxf0; cf   cfg)  m(maxf0; cm   cmg)
+ m (q) vd (d

m) + f (q) vd
 
df

+ vL
 
L  dm

+ vL
 
L  df

:
19
 TABLES 
TABLE 1: Distribution of Employment status of mothers in the sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2: Descriptive statistics. 
 Mean 
Standard 
Dev 
Min Max 
Mother 0.5 0.5 0 1 
Age 25-34 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Age 35-44 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Age 45-54 0.34 0.48 0 1 
Age 55-64 0.03 0.17 0 1 
University 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Selected Time Categories*     
Child_care 7.49 9.91 0 87.5 
Quality_child 3.53 5.9 0 51.1 
Basic_child 3.96 7.03 0 72.1 
Household_work 18.91 17.78 0 90.3 
TOThousehold_work 22.87 19.88 0 93.1 
Market_work 18.83 26.71 0 129.5 
Observations                         4,622 
 
 
 
  
Employment status Frequency  Percent  Cum. 
 1-Employed 1,332 57.64 57.64 
 2-Unemployed 268 11.60 69.23 
 3-Housewife 681 29.47 98.70 
 4-Student 4 0.17 98.87 
 5-Retired 18 0.78 99.65 
 6-Other 8 0.35 100.00 
 
Observations                                                      2,311                           100.00 
* The Mean of Time Categories variables is the average time spent per week, in hours.  
    Child_care = Basic_child + Quality_child, TOThousehold_work = Basic_child + Household_work 
 TABLE 3: Time spent in selected time categories by gender. 
  Average weekly time (hours) 
Child_care Fathers 5.48 
 Mothers 9.50 
 GENDER-TEST 
4.02*** 
(0.227) 
Quality_child Fathers 3.24 
 Mothers 3.83 
 GENDER-TEST 
0.59*** 
(0.15) 
Basic_child Fathers 2.25 
 Mothers 5.68 
 GENDER-TEST 
3.43*** 
(0.167) 
Household_work Fathers 8.13 
 Mothers 29.68 
 GENDER-TEST 
21.55*** 
(0.399) 
TOThousehold_work Fathers 10.37 
 Mothers 35.36 
 GENDER-TEST 
24.99*** 
(0.439) 
Market_work Fathers 26.45 
 Mothers 11.22 
 GENDER-TEST 
-15.23*** 
(0.64) 
Observations                                                       4,622 
 
 
  
Gender test is the test of the difference in means between fathers and mothers. Clustered 
standard errors at the household level reported in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 TABLE 4: Time spent in selected categories by education. 
 Average weekly time (hours)  
 High-School 
or less 
University EDUC-TEST 
Child_care 
7.06 9.50 2.44*** 
(0.475) 
Quality_child 
3.41 4.10 0.70*** 
(0.255) 
Basic_child 
3.65 5.40 1.75*** 
(0.335) 
Household_work 
19.30 17.11 -2.19*** 
(0.571) 
TOThousehold_work 
22.95 22.51 -0.44 
(0.672) 
Market_work 
18.88 18.61 -0.27 
(1.065) 
Observations:                                                  4,622 
 
 
 
  
Education test is the test of the difference in means between High-School or lower degree and 
University degree. Clustered standard errors at the household level reported in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
. 
 TABLE 5: Time spent in selected categories by gender and education. 
 Average  weekly time (hours)  
   
High-School 
or less 
University EDUC-TEST 
Child_care Fathers 5.27 6.64 
1.37** 
(0.562) 
 
Mothers 8.94 11.79 2.85*** 
(0.601) 
 
GENDER-TEST 3.67*** 
(0.255) 
5.15*** 
(0.621) 
 
Quality_child 
Fathers 3.17 3.62 0.46 
(0.382) 
 
Mothers 3.66 4.49 0.83*** 
(0.308) 
 
GENDER-TEST 0.49*** 
(0.166) 
0.87** 
(0.421) 
 
Basic_child 
Fathers 2.10 3.01 0.91*** 
(0.345) 
 
Mothers 5.27 7.30 2.03*** 
(0.470) 
 
GENDER-TEST 3.17*** 
(0.182) 
4.29*** 
(0.469) 
 
Household_work 
Fathers 8.10 8.30 0.21 
(0.619) 
 
Mothers 31.05 24.15 -6.90*** 
(0.775) 
 
GENDER-TEST 22.96*** 
(0.451) 
15.84*** 
(0.829) 
 
TOThousehold_work 
Fathers 10.20 11.32 1.12 
(0.748) 
 
Mothers 36.33 31.45 -4.88*** 
(0.883) 
 
GENDER-TEST 26.13*** 
(0.491) 
20.13*** 
(0.986) 
 
Market_work 
Fathers 26.72 24.97 -1.75 
(1.672) 
 
Mothers 10.65 13.52 2.87** 
(1.119) 
 
GENDER-TEST -16.07*** 
(0.822) 
-11.46*** 
(1.625) 
 
Obsevations                      4,622 
 
 
 
  
Gender test is the test of the difference in mean between fathers and mothers. Education test 
is the test of the difference in mean between High-School or lower degree and University 
degree. Clustered  standard errors at the household level reported in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
  
TABLE 6: Employment status of mothers in the sample by University degree. 
  University Degree   
Employed No Yes Total 
No 
894 
(48.27%) 
85 
(18.52%) 
979 
(42.36%) 
Yes 
958 
(51.73%) 
374 
(81.48%) 
1,332 
(57.64%) 
Total 
1,852 
(100%) 
459 
(100%) 
2,311 
(100%) 
 
